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Abstract
With the change in seasons comes the expected change of insurgency
operations in Afghanistan as Taliban and al-Qaida fighters mount their
spring and summer offensives against both NATO forces and Afghanis
sympathetic to foreign troops. As insurgents curtail their seasonal
operations with the arrival of fall and winter, is it likely that a threat may
arise from Afghanistan to affect the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British
Columbia? As will be illustrated herein, the threat to the games will not
be borne directly from the insurgency in Afghanistan but rather by the
universal jihadist ideology of al-Qaida rather than the nationalist beliefs
of their fellow fighters, the Taliban. This article aims to call attention to
the plausible threat to the 2010 Olympics posed by al-Qaida's far-
reaching terrorist network while also offering a focused threat analysis
based on the network's preferred tactics. Essentially, the power of al-
Qaida lies in their network: the threat to the Olympic Games stems from
proxy extremist and terrorist groups linked directly and indirectly to al-
Qaida.
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Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: 
The Threat of Terrorism and the 
2010 Olympics
By Serge E. Vidalis, CD, MA
"It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only pos-
sible attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive."
Colonel C.E. Callwell, 19061
Introduction
With the change in seasons comes the expected change of insurgency 
operations in Afghanistan as Taliban and al-Qaida fighters mount their 
spring and summer offensives against both NATO forces and Afghanis 
sympathetic to foreign troops. As insurgents curtail their seasonal opera-
tions with the arrival of fall and winter, is it likely that a threat may arise 
from Afghanistan to affect the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British 
Columbia? As will be illustrated herein, the threat to the games will not be 
borne directly from the insurgency in Afghanistan but rather by the uni-
versal jihadist ideology of al-Qaida rather than the nationalist beliefs of 
their fellow fighters, the Taliban. This article aims to call attention to the 
plausible threat to the 2010 Olympics posed by al-Qaida's far-reaching 
terrorist network while also offering a focused threat analysis based on 
the network's preferred tactics. Essentially, the power of al-Qaida lies in 
their network: the threat to the Olympic Games stems from proxy extrem-
ist and terrorist groups linked directly and indirectly to al-Qaida.
Nationalist vs. Universalist Terrorism
In his article "Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al-Qaida in Historical Per-
spective," Christopher J. Fettweis presents the typologies of terrorism as 
consisting of two camps, nationalist and ideological terrorists. Clearly, the 
Taliban fall into the nationalist camp as "their goals are territorial, usually 
as part of an attempt to carve out a homeland from an existing state or 
territory; their goals, therefore, have limited, rather than universal, appli-
cation" and "target the interests of the perceived occupier of their terri-
tory."2 In contrast, ideological terrorists aim to "agitate on behalf of an 
idea, not a people; they have no specific territorial aims; their goals have 
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no natural restrictions; and, as a result, their targets can be drawn from 
the universe of non-members, or non-believers in the cause."3 It is the lat-
ter of the two terror groups that pose a threat to the security and safety of 
the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. To better appreciate the potential threat to 
these games, a review of terrorist incidents from previous Olympic Games 
may prove valuable.
Previous Terrorist Incidents and the Olympic Games
Since the start of the modern Olympics, there have been only two terrorist 
events. The most infamous of these was the massacre of eleven Israeli ath-
letes during the 1972 Munich Olympics at the hands of Black September, a 
radical offshoot of the Fatah party, the militant faction of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), then under the leadership of Yasser 
Arafat. The birth of Black September came about by the expulsion and 
deaths of thousands of militant Palestinians residing in Jordan who 
fought for the return of their homeland. The purpose of Black September 
was "to let the world know of its people's plight and pursue a penchant for 
the destruction of Israel and Western interests" as retribution for their 
displacement. According to John K. Cooley's book, Green March Black 
September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, published in 1973, the 
organization was composed of numerous cells of militant followers, lead-
erless and dispersed throughout various regions of Europe and the world 
living very ordinary lives yet participating in terrorist activities as oppor-
tunity afforded. Their actions during the 1972 Munich Olympics had two 
purposes: to express to the world that the Palestinian people had been 
abandoned and to strike at their archenemy, Israel.
From Munich two lessons were learned; the first confirmed the difficul-
ties of counterterrorism operations to detect sympathizers and resistance 
fighters who may reside in foreign countries and are committed to pursu-
ing the organization's cause even though they are "decentralized" or effec-
tively "leaderless." The second was that nationalist terrorist groups are 
prone to attacking persons or interests representative of their fight. In 
this case, the victims were innocent Israeli athletes.
Twenty-four years later during the Atlanta Summer Olympics of 1996, the 
international community again witnessed an act of terror, an act of 
domestic terrorism founded on the ideological beliefs of one man, Eric 
Robert Rudolf. Rudolf, a former U.S. Army soldier, was eventually con-
victed for the death of one person at the Centennial Olympic Park by the 
detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) and for three other 
separate bombings in the Atlanta region. In a statement made by Rudolf 
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in 2005, he charged that the government of the United States was implicit 
in the deaths of infants by the legalization of abortion, and that the use of 
force to stop these killings was justified. Also an affront to his beliefs was 
his perception of the government's legitimization of homosexuality, which 
he felt weakened the moral fiber of American society.4 The Atlanta Olym-
pic bombing, in contrast to the Munich attack, demonstrated that ideolog-
ically motivated terrorists have "no boundaries and no end except the 
annihilation of"5 competing ideas. Such terrorists believe that their 
actions are an "awakening of the masses through violent example," and 
hope that they "will inspire a broad movement against their ideological 
enemy."6 
No different than in previous years, the 2010 Olympics present a target-
rich environment for terrorist groups, mainly because the games symbol-
ize unity in the international community. In addition, many of partici-
pants in the games—including the host-nation Canada—are supporting 
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The global radical jihadist 
ideology embraced by al-Qaida and its international supporters presents a 
unique challenge to domestic Canadian security forces; they must be pre-
pared for an enemy that is experienced and battle-proven.
Ideological Perspective of al-Qaida
Understanding the ideological beliefs of al-Qaida is essential in under-
standing the threat that they may pose to the 2010 Olympics. Al-Qaida's 
ideological dispensation can be traced to the late 1970s when its founder 
Usama bin Ladin became the "unofficial" ambassador of Saudi Arabia to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort to aid Afghanistan in its fight 
against the Soviets. A devoted supporter of the mujahideen, ibn Ladin 
aided many fighters and commanders in their efforts with the jihad. The 
Afghan jihad continued growing under the guidance of Abdullah Azzam 
with "an international network of overseas branches linked by mobile 
telephones, personal computers and lap-tops" where "in excess of 25,000 
foreign jihadis are said to have passed . . . to the Mujahedeen."7 
At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, ibn Ladin 
offered his services to defend Saudi Arabia by offering his "global network 
of ex-Afghanistan jihadists, beginning with several thousand Wahhabi 
veterans now back in Saudi."8 Ibn Ladin's overture of support was refused 
by the Saudi leadership, and ibn Ladin eventually fled the Kingdom to 
consolidate al-Qaida in Sudan and later Afghanistan.
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In 1996 ibn Ladin offered his support to the Taliban in return for 
protection in Afghanistan where he would renew his efforts of 
establishing terror-training camps for future operations. By 1997, ibn 
Ladin had issued his first fatwa, declaring it the "duty of all Muslims to 
'kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military . . . in any 
country in which it was possible.'"9 The fatwa was followed by the 
bombings of the U.S. Embassy in East Africa and the USS Cole, instantly 
creating the persona among young Muslim men in the umma that he was 
the vanguard of "Resistance to Western Imperialism." These acts of terror 
would propel ibn Ladin to the center stage of radical Muslims and 
Western intelligence agencies alike.
Current Threat Environment: Decentralized 
Terrorism and 'Lone Wolves'
Fast-forward to 2009: the once mighty and entrenched Taliban and al-
Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan have been on the run for eight years. They 
have largely sought refuge in familiar territory over the Afghan border in 
the northern tribal regions of Pakistan; the very area where ibn Ladin 
supported mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1979–1989 
Soviet campaign. Although there is no certainty that ibn Ladin is alive, 
there has been speculation that his medical condition has prevented him 
from resuming the leadership role he once performed. It is rumored that 
one of his elder sons has assumed this role.
Regardless of whether ibn Ladin is dead or alive, the al-Qaida establish-
ment has been shaken into a state that closely resembles what Fettweis 
calls the stage of "decentralization," a phase that can precede the collapse 
of terrorist organizations. In the case of al-Qaida, decentralization means 
that splinter groups or "lone wolves" aim to carry out terrorist acts in the 
name of al-Qaida. The al-Qaida network now appears to be a "leaderless 
resistance"10 as described by Cooley in reference to the dispersal of Black 
September sympathizers and fighters.
Such lone-wolf actors seek to become embedded within society and to 
pursue their nefarious activities from within as so-called "homegrown ter-
rorists." There are a number of Islamist and jihadist-inspired terrorist 
groups that are believed to have a presence in Canada. A number of 
groups and individuals have recently been discovered while preparing to 
carry out terrorist attacks.11 Several of these terrorist suspects had estab-
lished links to the al-Qaida network, acquired terror training overseas, 
and/or acquired explosive material, resources, and components in pursuit 
of their violent jihadist ideology. In the end, it is the lone wolves that must 
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be feared during the 2010 Olympics for they are not "constrained by . . .  
rational strategic limitations" and have "chosen the most-destructive 
weapons available to inflict the maximum amount of damage on people 
and property."12 
Risk of a Terrorist Attack at the Olympics with IEDs
The ability of a lone-wolf actor to hide within the population and strike 
with the intent to inflict the greatest amount of carnage possible is but one 
challenge for Olympic security forces. The ultimate challenge will be to 
detect and neutralize his weapon of choice—the improvised explosive 
device.
Since the commencement of combat operations in Afghanistan and the 
morphing into counterinsurgency operations, coalition forces have faced 
a growing threat from increasingly sophisticated IEDs. With an enormous 
stockpile of Soviet-era weapons, Taliban and al-Qaida fighters initially 
possessed an endless supply of high explosives derived mainly from aban-
doned bombs, projectiles and landmines from the failed Soviet Afghan 
campaign. In the initial stages of the recent Afghan war, the majority of 
IEDs were crudely built and initiated by command wires requiring the 
bombers to be in the same vicinity of their targets. Often these devices 
would be concealed in concrete barriers, deceased livestock, and other 
inanimate objects. As coalition forces developed counter-IED tactics, 
insurgent and terrorist bomb makers improved their construction meth-
ods by employing remote wireless firing devices and other electronic com-
ponents. Tactical use of these weapons also changed with the recruitment 
and deployment of suicide bombers who target their victims with body 
bombs or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devises (VBIED). The mes-
sage to be taken from Afghanistan in relation to the 2010 Olympics is that 
al-Qaida terrorists or their proxies are capable of exporting their bomb-
making expertise and their capabilities abroad to strike in Canada.
How Should the Threat to the Vancouver Olympics 
Mitigated?
The violent and radical ideology of al-Qaida and its decentralized sympa-
thizers who are engaged in the insurgency in Afghanistan present a clear 
and present danger to the security and safety of the 2010 Winter Olym-
pics. There are numerous terrorism plots that have recently been discov-
ered in Canada and the United States that illustrate the capability and 
desire of such terrorists to strike domestic targets with the use of explo-
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sive devices. The most severe threat facing the Olympics is in the form of 
IEDs, which can be concealed, transported and delivered by a lone-wolf 
terrorist inspired and supported by elements of al-Qaida to a populated 
and hard-to-secure public open area or venue much in the same manner 
that Eric Rudolf attacked the Atlanta Olympic Centennial Park.
One critical approach to mitigate the terrorist threat during the Olympics 
is for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to adopt and integrate counter-
terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies learned from the Canadian 
Forces (CF) fighting in Afghanistan. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
face many challenges in developing a learning culture to combat IEDs in 
particular. All organizations "acquire personalities over time" and 
"develop abilities in certain areas to accomplish the tasks of the organiza-
tion but are constrained by their experience to innovate only within the 
self-defined parameters of what they see as their purpose."13 The neces-
sity to develop a counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy for the 
upcoming 2010 Olympics Games requires a new mindset in domestic 
policing operations, and must take into account global terrorism, not just 
homegrown perpetrators.
Conclusion
Preventing the repeat of an Atlanta-style bombing will require the part-
nership of both public and private sector security agencies, and the coop-
eration of the general public to observe and report suspicious persons and 
activities. The tendency for public security agencies to work in "silos," 
self-contained administrative hierarchies with little or no contact with 
other hierarchies, could be the downfall to a secure and safe 2010 Olym-
pic games.
Hopefully, any terror threat to the Olympic Games will be extinguished 
before it can be initiated, but the threat is very real. Although efforts to 
secure the games have been going on for a considerable time and have 
continued to test the capacity of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, it 
must also be recognized that the Canada and its citizens have yet to be 
baptized by fire as the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, India, the United 
States and other victim nations of recent terrorist attacks.
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